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Abstract: 
We demonstrate a novel method for improving the efficiency of pollution permit markets by 
optimizing the exchange of emissions through trade. Under full-information, it is optimal for 
emissions to exchange according to the ratio of marginal damages. Under asymmetric 
information, we derive necessary conditions for the marginal damage trading ratios to be 
optimal, illustrate that the marginal damage trading ratios are generally not optimal, and show 
how to improve efficiency using optimal trading ratios. We calculate the optimal trading ratios 
for a global carbon market. The gains from using optimal trading ratios rather than marginal 
damage trading ratios range from substantial to trivial, which suggests the need for careful 
consideration of asymmetric information when designing permit markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Incentive-based environmental regulations, such as permit markets or emissions taxes, have 
typically been designed to minimize the costs of achieving emissions targets.2 Focusing on 
reducing abatement costs simplifies program implementation by eliminating the need to quantify 
damages from emissions of pollution. However, advances in air and water quality modeling now 
make it feasible to estimate damages precisely and thereby to incorporate them into program 
design. This suggests that regulators should turn from the narrow criterion of minimizing 
abatement costs to the more general criterion of efficiency that accounts for both abatement costs 
and damages (Muller and Mendelsohn, 2009). 
We analyze a novel method for improving the efficiency of pollution permit markets by 
optimizing the way in which emissions are exchanged through trade. In our model there is 
asymmetric information between the regulator and the regulated sources of pollution (à 
la Weitzman, 1974), and the sources can be differentiated by the number of permits they are 
required to hold for each unit of emissions (à laMontgomery, 1972). When sources trade permits, 
these differentiated requirements govern the exchange of emissions, and hence are typically 
called trading ratios. Several recent studies have shown that selecting trading ratios equal to the 
ratio of expected marginal damages can substantially increase efficiency relative to the one-for-
one trading found in many permit markets (Williams, 2002, Farrow et al., 2005, Muller and 
Mendelsohn, 2009, Henry et al., 2011 and Fowlie and Muller, 2013). Taking this as a point of 
departure, we ask if further efficiency improvements are possible. The rather surprising answer is 
yes. We derive necessary conditions for the marginal damage trading ratios to be optimal and 
characterize the optimal trading ratios. These results show that the optimal trading ratios 
generally depart from the marginal damage trading ratios. 
The reason that marginal damage trading ratios may not be optimal is the presence of 
asymmetric information about the costs of reducing pollution between the sources and the 
regulator that designs the market. Indeed, in a first-best environment with full information, the 
marginal damage trading ratios are optimal. However, permit markets are generally employed to 
allow firms to respond flexibly to private information about their abatement costs. This 
information is typically not available to the regulator when the regulator designs the program 
(Weitzman, 1974). In such a second-best environment, the regulator must account for the 
damages from pollution as well as the uncertainty about abatement costs when selecting the 
optimal trading ratios. 
To understand how this leads to a divergence between the optimal trading ratios and the marginal 
damage trading ratios, and to see the difference between our approach and other methods of 
accounting for asymmetric information, it is helpful to consider uniformly mixed pollution such 
as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Here marginal damages are equal across sources, and the 
marginal damage trading ratios actually imply one-for-one trading. But one-for-one trading is 
generally not the most efficient structure. Due to the asymmetric information, the regulator 
cannot set the aggregate permit endowment (i.e. the “cap”) at the ex post optimal level. The cap 
is either too tight, in the case abatement costs are higher than expected, or is too loose, in the 
case abatement costs are lower than expected. 
There are several ways to approach this problem. One might seek an answer in the mechanism 
design literature.3 Here the sources would provide a report about their private information to the 
regulator in advance of the market. The regulator would design the market based on the 
information provided by the sources in such a way that the sources have the incentive to 
truthfully reveal their costs. In practice however, mechanisms of this type have not been used for 
permit market design, perhaps because they greatly increase the complexity of the market. 
Another approach is to allow the cap to change in response to market conditions.4 For example, 
implementing a price ceiling allows the cap to expand when abatement costs are high, which 
improves efficiency. Several proposed permit markets have included provisions for a price 
ceiling. But the efficiency gains of a price ceiling may be mitigated by speculative attacks on it 
(Stocking, 2012 and Hasegawa and Salant, 2014), and adding a price ceiling to a permit market 
once again increases its complexity. These issues with the standard approaches suggest scope for 
an alternative way to improve efficiency that retains the simplicity of a basic permit market, at 
least from the point of view of the sources. 
Our approach is to improve efficiency by adjusting the trading ratios away from marginal 
damages. This creates flexibility in total emissions even though the number of permits is fixed at 
the cap. For example, if a firm with a relatively low trading ratio sells a permit to a firm with a 
relatively high trading ratio, then the total emissions of pollution decrease. By selecting the 
trading ratios optimally, the regulator can, in effect, allow increased emissions when the costs are 
high and require decreased emissions when costs are low. Although this argument is most 
intuitive for uniformly mixed pollution, the general point applies to non-uniformly mixed 
pollution as well. In either case, efficiency can be improved by using optimal trading ratios 
rather than marginal damage trading ratios. 
The importance of our analysis of optimal trading ratios is buttressed by three observations. First, 
regulators are incorporating trading ratios into a variety of existing and proposed permit markets. 
Despite this growing interest, optimal implementation of trading ratios has not been studied. 
Second, regulators are grappling with how to regulate non-uniformly mixed pollution. Permit 
markets with trading ratios are well suited for this task. Third, proposed markets to limit GHG 
emissions would swamp existing permit markets in size and scope. The massive scale of such 
programs implies that efficiency gains from using optimal trading ratios could be quite large in 
absolute terms, even if they are small in relative terms. 
Given these observations, it is not sufficient to just delineate the optimal trading ratios, we must 
also investigate the practical importance of using optimal trading ratios rather than marginal 
damage trading ratios. We accomplish this through the numerical analysis of a multi-country 
carbon emission market. We show that the optimal trading ratios lead to efficiency 
improvements relative to marginal damage trading ratios. The magnitude of these improvements 
varies from significant to trivial, depending in particular on the regulators' uncertainty about 
abatement costs. This suggests that regulators should give careful consideration to the structure 
of asymmetric information when designing future permit markets. 
Our analysis combines two prominent strands of the literature on incentive based regulations. 
The first is based on Montgomery (1972), who formally introduced the idea of trading ratios in 
permit markets. Montgomery recognized that, if damage from pollution differs across sources, 
then emissions licenses should not simply trade one-for-one. His proposed trading rules are 
consistent with marginal damage trading ratios.5 The second is based on Weitzman (1974), who 
introduced the idea of informational asymmetries in permit markets. Because the parameters of 
permit markets must be set potentially years in advance, the regulator lacks information which 
will be available to market participants when they make abatement decisions. This asymmetric 
information has important implications for the choice of policy instruments and the resulting 
literature on “prices vs. quantities” is vast.6 We are interested in a different question: What 
happens to Montgomery's trading ratios when we apply Weitzman's fundamental insight about 
asymmetric information? There has not been a systematic study of this issue.7 
The authors who come closest to disentangling the relationship between trading ratios and 
asymmetric information are Fowlie and Muller (2013). In analyzing a model with quadratic 
abatement costs and linear damages, they observe that, under asymmetric information, the 
marginal damage trading ratios may not perform as well as simple one-for-one trading. This 
suggests, of course, that there may be a completely different set of trading ratios that dominate 
either benchmark. But they do not pursue this line of inquiry. To replicate their observation, we 
construct a simple numerical example in which one-for-one trading does indeed dominate the 
marginal damage trading ratios. We go on to calculate the optimal trading ratios and show that 
they perform better than either the marginal damage trading ratios or one-for-one trading. 
Section 2 presents the model and derives the main results. We describe necessary conditions for 
the marginal damage trading ratios to be optimal and characterize the optimal trading ratios. We 
additionally analyze source-specific taxes and show that they generally depart from expected 
marginal damages. Section 3 analyzes a special case of the model in which the abatement costs 
and damages have the familiar linear-quadratic form. This additional structure enables us to 
determine necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimality of marginal damage trading 
ratios. In Section 4 we discuss information issues associated with implementing both marginal 
damage and optimal trading ratios. In Section 5, we use a simple two-source example of a linear-
quadratic model to provide a numerical illustration of the main results. Section 6 presents a 
preliminary calculation of the gains from optimal trading ratios for a hypothetical global carbon 
trading market. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Model 
There are n regulated sources of pollution. The description of a source varies depending on the 
particular application of the model. For example, a source may correspond to a single facility, or 
it may correspond to a large group of firms within the same sector of a given country's economy. 
The abatement costs for sourcei are Ci(ei; θi), where ei is the emissions from source i and θ
i   is a parameter that influences costs. Because abatement costs are in terms of emissions, we 
define marginal abatement costs as . We assume costs are convex in emission 
reductions, so that  and  The value of the cost parameter θi is known by 
source i when the abatement decision is made. In contrast, the regulator treats θias a random 
variable. 8 Initially we assume that the regulator knows the distribution for each random variable. 
Later we discuss the extent to which this assumption can be relaxed. We use the expression “cost 
shocks” to refer to various realizations of these random variables. Let E = (e1, e2,…, en) denote 
the vector of emissions. 
Emissions cause damages, which are specified by a convex damage function D(E). The marginal 
damage from source i   is . We say a damage function is regular if it can be written as 
 equation(1) 
for some convex function F and set of positive αi's. Two familiar special cases of regular 
damage functions are uniformly mixed pollution, in which αi = 1 for every i, and constant 
marginal damage, in which F is linear. 
The regulator uses a permit market to ameliorate the damages from pollution. We assume this 
permit market is competitive. Each source is given an endowment of 
permits wi and w = ∑ wi denotes the aggregate endowment. The sources face possibly different 
constraints on the number of permits they must surrender for each unit of emissions. These 
constraints are described by a source-specific variable ri that is chosen by the regulator. In 
particular, if source i emits ei units of pollution then they must surrender riei permits. The ratio 
of ri to rj reflects the rate at which emissions of source i can be converted to emissions of 
source j through the trade of permits between the two sources. 9 If the ratio  is the same for 
every i and j, then we have one-for-one trading of emissions. Following the literature, we refer to 
the ri's as trading ratios. 
The choice variables for the regulator are nominally the trading ratios and the permit 
endowments. However, because we assume the permit market is competitive and abatement 
costs are convex, the market equilibrium depends only on the aggregate endowment w and is 
independent of the distribution of the wi. 10 Moreover, the permit market equilibrium is 
unchanged if the trading ratios and the aggregate endowment are all multiplied by the same 
constant. Without loss of generality, then, we can normalize w as convenient. In our theoretical 
analysis we normalize it to be equal to one. 
Given a price p for permits, source i selects emissions to minimize the sum of abatement costs 
and expenditures in the permit market. Source i's problem is 11 
 
The first-order condition for ei is 
 equation(2) 
which modifies the usual equality between marginal abatement cost and price to account for the 
trading ratio. An immediate consequence of this equation is that, if two sources have different 
trading ratios, then their marginal abatement costs will not be equal, i.e., the regulation is not 
cost-effective. Under our normalization of w, the permit market clearing equation is 
 equation(3) 
The permit market equilibrium, conditioned on the regulator's choice of trading ratios, is 
summarized by Eqs. (2) and (3). This is a system of n + 1 equations and n + 1 unknowns (each of 
the ei and p). We assume there is a unique solution as a function of the vector of trading 
ratios R and the vector of cost parameters Θ. Thus we have ei(R; Θ), E(R; Θ), and p(R; Θ). 
The regulator selects values for the trading ratios to minimize the expected sum of abatement 
costs and damages. Thus the regulator's problem is to choose R to minimize 
 
Define optimal trading ratios as the trading ratios which minimize this objective. 12 The 
corresponding first-order condition for rj is 
 equation(4) 
There is not a simple closed form solution to the first-order conditions, even in a standard case in 
which the abatement cost functions and the damage function are quadratic.13 
Now consider the intuitive, but generally inferior, approach to selecting the trading ratios based 
on marginal damages. To motivate why one may want to use trading ratios of this type, suppose 
for the moment that there is no uncertainty about abatement costs. In this case, the efficient 
emissions solve 
 
The first-order condition for ei is 
 
Combining these with Eq. (2) gives 
 equation(5) 
Thus, when there is no uncertainty, the trading ratios should be set according to marginal 
damages. 
In our model, there is uncertainty about abatement costs. So the regulator cannot select trading 
ratios according to Eq. (5) because the ej, and therefore marginal damages and p, are stochastic. 
But we can define marginal damage trading ratios by taking the expectation of Eq. (5). There are 
a couple of ways to proceed. Our preferred definition is constructed from the conditions 14 
 equation(6) 
We use these conditions to pin down all of the trading ratios except r1. This remaining trading 
ratio is determined by the solution to an optimization problem, as follows. Let the solution to 
Eq. (6) be denoted by  and let  The regulator's problem in this 
case is to find the value for r1that minimizes total expected costs: 
 
The first-order condition for r1 is 
 equation(7) 
The first-order condition implies that the regulator sets marginal abatement costs equal to 
marginal damages on average where the average is weighted by the 's.15 Let  be the solution 
to Eq. (7) and let . We refer to the vector  as the marginal damage trading 
ratios. 
If the damage function is regular, then the conditions defining the marginal damage trading ratios 
simplify considerably. Combining Eq. (1) with Eq. (6) implies 
 
For example, if pollution is uniformly mixed, then the marginal damage trading ratios are all 
equal to a common value and hence imply one-for-one trading. 
Our first main result is to show that the marginal damage trading ratios will generally not be 
optimal. This may seem a bit surprising, so let us first give intuition for why it is indeed true 
before turning to a more formal analysis.16 Building on our discussion of this point in 
the Introduction, once again focus on the special case of uniformly mixed pollution. Here 
marginal damages are the same across sources, so one might expect that trading ratios should be 
equal across sources as well. To see why such one-for-one trading is, in fact, not generally 
optimal for uniformly mixed pollution, consider the market equilibrium condition (Eq. (3)). 
Evaluating this at the solution ei(R; θ) gives 
 equation(8) 
Now suppose for the moment the market is indeed designed with one-for-one trading and let r be 
the common value for the trading ratios. It follows from Eq. (8) that the sum of emissions is 
equal to the constant , which is the effective permit endowment, i.e., “the cap”. In general, 
however, when the trading ratios differ between sources, the sum of emissions will not be 
constant, and moreover, it will vary according to the realized values of Θ. This suggests that 
permit markets that do not use one-for-one trading have an interesting and under-appreciated 
feature. In these markets, sources in aggregate may emit more (or less) pollution depending on 
the actual values of the abatement cost functions, even though the aggregate permit endowment 
is fixed. 
The regulator, in turn, can use this feature to improve the performance of the permit market. 
Because of the uncertainty about abatement costs, the regulator does not know the efficient 
quantity of pollution. Loosely speaking, when aggregate marginal abatement costs are high, the 
efficient quantity of pollution is large. When the aggregate marginal abatement costs are low, the 
efficient quantity of pollution is small. The regulator can engender a similar relationship between 
emissions and abatement costs by optimally selecting the trading ratios. 
Now return to the formal analysis of the general case of an arbitrary damage function. To show 
that the marginal damage trading ratios will generally not be optimal, we utilize the structure of 
the regulator's problem as well as the characteristics of the marginal damage trading ratios to 
evaluate the derivative of the regulator's objective function W at the marginal damage trading 
ratios. This gives us our first main result (all proofs are in the Appendix). 
Proposition 1. 
The derivative of the regulator's objective function  W with respect to rj, evaluated at the 
marginal damage trading ratios  , is given by 
 
 
 
where the covariances and the expectations are also evaluated at  , ai≡ ri2/C′i′, and A≡∑
iai. 
We see that the derivative of W with respect to rj, evaluated at the marginal damage trading 
ratios, can be written as the sum of n + 2 covariance terms plus an additional term which is the 
product of two expected values. 
Proposition 1 has three main implications. First, setting the derivatives  equal to zero 
provides necessary conditions for the optimality of marginal damage trading ratios. Conversely, 
it shows that if at least one of the derivatives is not equal to zero, then the marginal damage 
trading ratios are not optimal. We will analyze the properties of the derivatives through a variety 
of special cases and numerical examples. But at this point, it is important to stress that there is no 
reason, in general, that the overall sums of terms in the expressions for them should be equal to 
zero. In other words, the marginal damage trading ratios are generally not optimal. 
Second, to a first-order approximation, Proposition 1 shows how to improve efficiency and gives 
the magnitude of the efficiency gains from this improvement. If  is positive, then the 
objective function can be reduced by decreasing the trading ratio rj below the marginal damage 
trading ratio . If it is negative, then the objective function can be reduced by increasing rj above 
the marginal damage trading ratio . The magnitude of the derivative gives the efficiency gain in 
moving from a marginal damage trading ratio toward an optimal trading ratio. This magnitude 
depends on the marginal damages, the marginal damage trading ratios, and the uncertainty about 
price and emissions generated by the uncertainty about the abatement cost functions. 
A final implication of Proposition 1 is that the optimal trading ratios lead to a loss of ex post cost 
effectiveness. Once again this is perhaps most clearly illustrated with the case of uniformly 
mixed pollution. If trading ratios are not one-for-one, then by Eq. (2), the marginal abatement 
costs are not equal. Aggregate abatement costs could be reduced by increasing abatement from a 
low-cost source and decreasing abatement from a high-cost source. The regulator tolerates this 
loss of ex post cost effectiveness to obtain the gain in ex ante efficiency from using the optimal 
trading ratios. 
Next consider a special case in which damage functions are regular as defined in Eq. (1). For this 
special case, the derivative in Proposition 1 simplifies considerably. 
Corollary 1. 
Suppose that the damage function is regular. Then the derivative of the regulator's objective 
function  W with respect to rj, evaluated at the marginal damage trading ratios  , is given by 
 
 
For regular damage functions, setting these derivatives equal to zero provides necessary 
conditions for the optimality of marginal damage trading ratios. The marginal damage trading 
ratios are not optimal if at least one COV(p, ej), evaluated at , is not equal to zero. Although 
both the cases of uniformly mixed pollution and linear damages have received attention in the 
literature, Corollary 1 appears to be a novel insight. 
To understand the key role that the covariance of emissions and prices plays in the determination 
of optimal trading ratios when damages are regular, it is helpful to consider a simple example 
with uniformly mixed pollution and two sources. In this example, Source 1's marginal abatement 
costs are known with certainty. Source 2's cost shock can either be high (H) or low (L) with 
equal probability. Fig. 1 shows the market with marginal damage trading ratios (one-for-one 
trading). There are marginal abatement costs for each source, two aggregate (or “market”) 
marginal abatement costs corresponding to the high and low outcome, and marginal 
damages. 17 The first-best outcome occurs at the intersection of the appropriate market marginal 
abatement cost and marginal damages. Because of asymmetric information, the first-best 
outcome is not obtained. For example, in the event of the high cost shock, the total permit 
endowment is too small, marginal abatement costs exceed marginal damages, and there is a 
deadweight loss relative to the first-best outcome. This deadweight loss is indicated by the upper 
triangle in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1. Marginal damage trading ratios with uniformly mixed pollution. 
The x-axis is in units of emissions (e.g., in tons) and the y-axis measures value per unit (e.g., 
dollar per ton). 
Inspection of the relationship between the points in Fig. 1 reveals that  for either 
source. In fact, the covariance of emissions and prices is negative for Source 1, but positive for 
Source 2. Corollary 1 shows that efficiency can be improved by increasing Source 1's trading 
ratio, but decreasing Source 2's trading ratio. By giving a favorable trading ratio to the source 
whose emissions are large when the permit price is high, the regulator can, in essence, relax the 
aggregate emissions constraint in the event of high prices and hence improve efficiency.18 
Having shown that the marginal damage trading ratios are generally not optimal, we now turn to 
characterizing the optimal trading ratios. This gives us our second main result. 
Proposition 2. 
The optimal trading ratios satisfy 
 equation(9) 
This result reinforces the distinction between optimal trading ratios and marginal damage trading 
ratios. In general, the ratio of one optimal trading ratio to another will not simply be equal to the 
ratio of expected marginal damages. Rather, the ratio will depend on more complicated 
expectations—that include price and the slope of marginal abatement costs in addition to marginal 
damages—as well as higher order moments of the regulator's uncertainty.19 If there is no 
uncertainty, however, then the covariances in Proposition 2 are equal to zero and the other 
quantities are deterministic, so that Eq. (9) satisfies Eq. (6). As we would expect from our earlier 
discussion, the optimal trading ratios satisfy the conditions for the marginal damage trading 
ratios in this case. 
2.1. Optimal source-specific taxes 
Due to asymmetric information, the optimal trading ratios depend on more than just expected 
marginal damages. This raises the question as to whether pricing mechanisms, such as pollution 
taxes, should be set equal to marginal damages or whether they too should be adjusted under 
asymmetric information.20 
Suppose ti is the tax per unit of emissions for source i, and T is the vector of source-specific 
taxes. As is well-known, the source will equate its marginal abatement costs and the tax, so the 
first-order condition forei in the source's cost minimization problem is 
 equation(10) 
Let the solution to this equation be ei(T; Θ). The regulator selects the source-specific taxes to 
minimize the expected sum of abatement costs and damages. Thus the regulator's problem is to 
choose T to minimize 
 
The first-order condition of the regulator's objective with respect to tj is 21 
 equation(11) 
Solving for tj implies that  
 equation(12) 
Since in general there is no reason the covariance term in Eq. (12) should equal zero, it is 
generally not the case that optimal source-specific taxes should equal expected marginal 
damages. The optimal source-specific taxes should be adjusted by a factor that depends on the 
second derivative of the abatement cost function.22 
The optimal source-specific taxes in Eq. (12) are related to the theory of optimal taxation first 
studied by Ramsey (1927). In optimal Ramsey taxation, larger taxes are applied to more inelastic 
goods. Note that 1/C″ is related to the abatement cost elasticity. 23 Thus if marginal damages 
are high when the abatement cost elasticity is high, then the second term in Eq. (12) is positive 
and the optimal source-specific tax exceeds expected marginal damages (i.e., is larger in the 
inelastic good). This intuition is illustrated graphically in Additional Appendix D. 
3. A linear-quadratic example 
Additional insight into the structure of the optimal trading ratios, the marginal damage trading 
ratios, and the differences between them can be gleaned from an example with specific 
functional forms. In this example, the abatement cost function 
 equation(13) 
is quadratic and the marginal abatement cost function 
 equation(14) 
is linear. We interpret θi as the intercept and λi as the slope of the marginal abatement cost 
function. It is convenient to collect the λi into a diagonal matrix Λ. We assume that the random 
variables θi are independent, and we let the expected values and variances be denoted 
by  and σi2, respectively. 
The damage function is quadratic as well. We have 
 equation(15) 
where W is a vector with entries ωi and V is a symmetric matrix with entries vij. Marginal 
damages are given by 
 
Some special cases are worth noting. First, if V is the zero matrix, then damages are linear and 
marginal damages are constant. Second, if ωi = ω for every i and vij = v for every i and j, then 
pollution is uniformly mixed. 
A distinct advantage of the linear-quadratic example is that we can obtain simple closed-form 
expressions for p and ej. These, in turn, enable us to give an explicit expression for COV(p, ej). 
We state this as the first of several results for the linear-quadratic example (The proofs are in 
Additional Appendix A.). 
Result 1. 
In the linear-quadratic example, 
 equation(16) 
It follows that, if the damage function is regular, then the marginal damage trading ratios are 
optimal if and only if  is the same for every source j. 
The additional structure of the quadratic example enables us to give necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the optimality of the marginal damage trading ratios. As expected from our 
discussion of Proposition 1, marginal damage trading ratios are optimal only under fairly 
restrictive conditions. Result 1 shows that, for regular damages, the optimality of the marginal 
damages trading ratios depends on whether or not the abatement cost functions exhibit a specific 
type of homogeneity. If the ratio of the variance of the cost parameter σj2 to the slope of the 
marginal abatement cost function λj is the same across all sources, then the marginal damage 
trading ratios are optimal. If, however, the ratios of the variance to the slope vary across sources, 
then marginal damage trading ratios are not optimal. This includes the case in which the 
distributions for the θi's are exactly the same across sources, but the λi's are different. 
Building on Result 1, we can quantify the efficiency gains from moving from marginal damage 
trading ratios toward the optimal trading ratios. The slope of the regulator's objective at the 
marginal damage trading ratios gives a first-order approximation of these efficiency gains. For 
regular damage functions, this first-order approximation for a small change in rj is given by 
Eq. (16). Thus the relative gain from a small change in rj is larger if σj2/λj is further from the 
weighted average of the σi2/λi's. If we adjust all the rj's from the marginal damage trading 
ratios toward the optimal trading ratios, the first-order approximation of the gain will be larger if 
the σj2/λj's are further from their weighted average, intuitively, if the dispersion of the σj2/λ
j's is larger. A special case of regular damage functions illustrates this intuition most clearly. 
Result 2. 
In the linear-quadratic example, suppose that pollution is uniformly mixed and that λi = 1 for 
every i. To a first-order approximation, the efficiency advantage of taking a step of unit length 
from the marginal damage trading ratios toward the optimal trading ratios is given by 
 
The square root term in Δ corresponds to the standard deviation of the list of numbers σ12, σ22,
…, σn2. As expected, an increase in this standard deviation leads to an increase in Δ. The effect 
of an increase in n is not as straightforward because it depends on the assumption we make about 
what happens to the distribution of the σi. For example, suppose we make the rather obvious 
assumption that the mean and variance of this distribution are constant with respect to n. This 
yields the unambiguous result that Δ is decreasing in n. But this assumption also implies that the 
regulator's uncertainty about aggregateabatement costs is decreasing in n. 24 In other words, the 
magnitude of the regulator's asymmetric information problem becomes less severe as n increases. 
An alternative assumption is that the distribution of the σi changes in such a way that the 
magnitude of the regulator's problem remains constant with respect to n. Here it is easy to 
construct examples in which Δ is increasing in n, even with our assumption that the uncertainty 
is uncorrelated across sources. 25 
In summary, for regular damage functions, heterogeneity of abatement costs (through differences 
in the ratio of variance of cost uncertainty to slope of marginal abatement cost) leads to a wedge 
between the optimal trading ratios and the marginal damage trading ratios. The greater the 
degree of this heterogeneity, the greater the efficiency advantage of the optimal trading ratios. 
Next consider arbitrary damage functions. To study these, we simplify the linear-quadratic case 
by eliminating the abatement cost heterogeneity that was critical in our discussion of regular 
damage functions. Accordingly, we have 
 equation(17) 
Under this assumption, we can characterize the regulator's objective as follows. 
Result 3. 
In the linear-quadratic example, suppose that Eq. (17) holds. Then we have 
 equation(18) 
where I is the identity matrix. 
As we might expect, the quadratic functions yield a mean-variance structure for the regulator's 
objective.26 We can also give a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimality of the 
marginal damage trading ratios. 
Result 4. 
In the linear-quadratic example, suppose Eq. (17) holds, W = 0, andVis invertible. Then the 
marginal damage trading ratios are optimal if and only if  E[Θ]is an eigenvector ofV. 
Result 4 is similar in structure to Result 1 in that it provides a fairly restrictive necessary and 
sufficient condition for marginal damages trading ratios to be optimal. In this case, with 
heterogeneity on the damages side, the condition is defined with respect to the vector of expected 
values, rather than being a condition on the variances. If it holds, then the marginal damage 
trading ratios, the expected emissions, and the expected cost parameters all lie on the same ray 
from the origin. This ray is also an eigenvector of V. It turns out that this eigenvector maximizes 
the quadratic form in Eq. (18), which effectively eliminates concerns about uncertainty. Hence 
the optimal trading ratios, which in general differ from the marginal damage trading ratio on 
account of such uncertainty, offer no improvement relative to the marginal damage trading ratios 
in this case.27 
Taken as a whole, the results for the quadratic example reinforce and enhance our findings from 
the general model. Under the necessary and sufficient conditions, the marginal damage trading 
ratios are optimal, but this will generally not occur. The efficiency gains from using the optimal 
trading ratios depend in a complicated manner on distributions of both the expected value and 
variances of the random variables in the cost functions as well as the interaction of these 
distributions with the properties of the damage function. 
4. Information and implementation issues 
Up to now we have assumed that the regulator knows the entire distribution for each of the 
random variables θi. In this section we consider the extent to which this can be relaxed for both 
the marginal damage trading ratios and the optimal trading ratios. We also consider how the 
regulator can obtain the needed information. 
First consider the optimal trading ratios. The regulator needs enough information to evaluate the 
expectation of the products of the partial derivative terms in the first-order conditions (Eq. (4)). 
These terms will generally be at least linear in the θi's so that the product will be at least 
quadratic. This implies that the regulator would need to know at least the expected values and 
variances of the distributions for the θi's. In the linear-quadratic example, this information is 
actually all that the regulator needs to know. This can easily be seen from Result 3, but it is also 
true under more general conditions than those used in Result 3 because, in the linear-quadratic 
model, each of the partial derivative terms in Eq. (4) is precisely linear in the θi's. 
Next consider the marginal damage trading ratios. Here the regulator needs enough information 
to evaluate the expectation of the products of the partial derivative terms in the first-order 
conditions (Eq. (7)) as well as the marginal damage trading ratio constraint set (Eq. (6)). This 
suggests that the regulator will generally need the same kind of information that is required to 
implement the optimal trading ratios. But, if damages are regular, then the regulator may need 
less information. Under regular damages, the relative values of the marginal damage trading 
ratios are determined directly by the αi's. Thus it is tempting to conclude that the regulator need 
not have any information about the distributions for the random variablesθi. This is not correct, 
however, as the regulator must also determine the optimal value for r1, which requires enough 
information to evaluate the expected market price. 28 So, for example, if the abatement costs are 
quadratic and damages are regular, then the regulator needs to know the expected values of the 
random variables but not the variances. 
How can the regulator obtain the expected values and variances of the distributions for the θi's? 
One obvious procedure would be to conduct an econometric analysis of the relationship between 
emissions and abatement costs for each source. This procedure provides a direct estimate of the 
desired parameters, but it has significant data requirements. In addition, it is inherently backward 
looking, whereas the usual interpretation of the regulator's uncertainty is with respect to 
abatement costs in the future. Alternatively, one could assume that the parameters are 
proportional to some easily observable characteristic of the sources. For example, in their 
analysis of Nitrogen pollution from waste water treatment plants, Yates et al. (2013) assume that 
the expected value and variance are proportional to the plant size. 29 The cost of this approach is 
that it may introduce inaccuracies in the determination of the expected value and variances, 
which would in turn reduce the efficiency gains from implementing the optimal trading ratios. 
Yet another procedure would be to take a subjective Bayesian approach and directly assess the 
regulator's beliefs about abatement cost uncertainty. Although this procedure is in many ways the 
most theoretically appealing, making policy choices in this manner may raise significant 
practical problems. 
It may also be possible to determine a crude but direct estimate of optimal trading ratios in 
particular markets. For example, consider the European Union's Emission Trading Scheme (EU-
ETS) for carbon pollution. This permit market has been operating under the marginal damage 
trading ratios (one-for-one trading) for about seven years. Therefore, one should be able to 
calculate the covariances in Corollary 1 based on existing market data. Trading ratios adjusted 
from unity according to the estimated covariances may give an efficiency improvement relative 
to one-for-one trading. But again some caution is warranted, as these trading ratios are based on 
past variation in abatement costs, not future variation. 
There is also the issue of the size of the market and how many trading ratios a regulator may 
feasibly determine. For example, the EU-ETS contains over 12,000 sources. It may be 
impractical to determine trading ratios for all of them. In this case, it may be useful to divide the 
sources into groups (for example by country and sector of the economy) and then determine a 
trading ratio for each group. In Additional Appendix F, we give an example in which we 
determine trading ratios for approximately 50 sources, so it should be feasible to determine at 
least this number of trading ratios in actual practice. In the EU-ETS, this would allow for two 
sectors in each member state. 
Turning now to implementation issues, optimal trading ratios may conflict with the requirements 
of some environmental regulations in ways that marginal damage trading ratios do not. Consider 
water pollution regulation under the Clean Water Act. Suppose there is an estuary for which a 
total maximum daily load has been specified and there are a number of waste water treatment 
plants that discharge emissions upstream of the estuary. The Clean Water Act allows permit 
trade between the plants, provided that the water quality at the estuary remains constant. This can 
be insured by setting trading ratios equal to the transfer coefficients that describe the percentage 
of emissions from a given plant that reach the estuary. If we further assume that damages are 
regular, then these trading ratios are in fact marginal damage trading ratios. The optimal trading 
ratios will lead to lower expected total costs, but they may not be consistent with the regulatory 
requirements because permit trade may lead to a change in the water quality at the estuary. 
Similar issues may arise for air pollution due to National Ambient Air Quality Standards. 
Another implementation issue arises for both optimal trading ratios and marginal damage trading 
ratios. One-for-one trading has an appealing uniformity—each source is treated the same by the 
regulator. To implement optimal trading ratios, or to implement marginal damage trading ratios 
when pollution is not uniformly mixed, the regulator must select source specific regulation. This 
may create an opportunity for sources to lobby for a more favorable trading ratio. As is well 
known from the literature on rent-seeking, such lobbying activities often decrease welfare. 
5. Numerical calculations 
In this section we use a simple example of the linear-quadratic model to illustrate Corollary 1 
with numerical calculations.30 There are two sources, and the slope of marginal abatement costs 
are equal across sources. Source 1's marginal abatement costs are known with certainty but 
Source 2's cost shock can either be high (H) or low (L) with equal probability. Damages are 
linear and differ across the two sources. Source 1 has low marginal damages (MD1 = 10) and 
Source 2 has high marginal damages (MD2 = 12). This example is also consistent with the model 
employed by Fowlie and Muller (2013). 
Table 1 illustrates the results for the marginal damage trading ratios, one-for-one trading, and the 
optimal trading ratios. From Eq. (6), the marginal damage trading ratios satisfy r2 = 12/10 * r1. 
Panel A of  Table 1shows that, under marginal damage trading ratios, the value for r1 is 0.92, so 
that r2 = 1.10. Thus the low damage source (Source 1) pays a relatively low effective price for its 
emissions and the high damage source (Source 2) pays a relatively high effective price for its 
emissions. The marginal damage trading ratios hold damages constant across the two cost 
shocks, but allow aggregate emissions to vary. 
Table 1. Numerical example: linear damages with MD1 = 10, MD2 = 12 a. 
 
MAC1 Price MAC2 e1 e2 e1 + e2 Damages 
Panel A: Marginal damage trading ratios. 
r1 = 0.92; r2 = 12/10r1 = 1.10; DWL = 7.38 
Low cost 7.54 8.21 9.05 12.46 5.95 18.41 196.0 
High cost 12.46 13.57 14.95 7.54 10.05 17.59 196.0  
Panel B: One-for-one trading. 
r1 = 1; r2 = 1; DWL = 7.25 
Low cost 8.5 8.5 8.5 11.5 6.5 18 193 
High cost 13.5 13.5 13.5 6.5 11.5 18 203  
Panel C: Optimal trading ratios. 
r1 = 0.96; r2 = 1.04; DWL = 7.06 
Low cost 8.09 8.39 8.76 11.91 6.24 18.14 193.9 
High cost 13.08 13.56 14.16 6.92 10.84 17.77 199.3 
aThe example is parameterized by MAC1 = 20 − e1; MAC2L = 15 − e1; MAC2H = 25 − e1; where 
high and low costs occur with equal probability. Total permits are normalized to 18, which 
would be the optimal emissions with 1:1 trading. 
Interestingly, one-for-one trading actually performs better than marginal damage trading, even 
though pollution is not uniformly mixed in this example. As shown in Panel B of Table 1, under 
one-for-one trading, the damages are not held constant across the cost shocks, but the aggregate 
emissions are held constant. This leads to a lower deadweight loss than marginal damage trading 
ratios, which verifies Fowlie and Muller's observation that such an outcome is possible in their 
model. 
The optimal trading ratios have a lower deadweight loss than either of the other schemes. Panel 
C of Table 1 shows calculations for the optimal trading ratios. At the marginal damage trading 
ratios, we haveCOV(p, e1) < 0. It follows from Corollary 1 that the optimal trading ratio for 
source 1 is greater than the marginal damage trading ratio (0.96 vs. 0.93). On the other 
hand COV(p, e2) > 0, so the optimal trading ratio for source 2 is lower than the marginal damage 
trading ratio (1.04 vs 1.10). Under the optimal trading ratios, neither the aggregate emissions nor 
the damages are constant across the cost shocks. This flexibility improves efficiency. 
6. Application: carbon trading 
We have established that the optimal trading ratios will generally be different from the marginal 
damage trading ratios, even for uniformly mixed pollution. We now investigate potential policy 
implications of this observation by considering a permit trading application with uniformly 
mixed pollution. In Additional Appendix F, we give an additional application with non-
uniformly mixed pollution. 
Consider a stylized global carbon trading market. Ackerman and Bueno (2011) determine simple 
two-parameter functions that characterize the cost of reducing carbon emissions for various 
geographic regions of the world.31 To apply these to our model, we interpret our sources as 
regions and write Ackerman and Bueno's functions in terms of emissions rather than emission 
reductions. This gives 
 
where ai and bi are constants determined by Ackerman and Bueno. We interpret bi(1 + θi) as 
the stochastic business-as-usual (BAU) emissions. For simplicity we model the random 
variable θi with a three point symmetric distribution with zero expectation so that θi takes on 
the values {− ki, 0, ki} with probabilities {ρi, 1 − 2ρi, ρi}. For example, ρi is the probability 
that BAU emissions increase by ki percent over their expected value. We also assume that the θ
i are independent across regions. To complete the model we specify the marginal damage 
function as 
 
where β (the slope of marginal damage) comes from Newell and Pizer (2003) and s (the social 
cost of carbon at expected BAU) comes from IWGSSC (2010). 
For simplicity, we focus on the industrial sectors of the four regions with the largest emissions: 
China, Europe, South/South East Asia, and the U.S. The results are given in Table 2 and Table 3. 
For a given set of parameters ρi and ki, we calculate the total expected costs (expected sum of 
abatement costs and damages) under the optimal trading ratios and the marginal damage trading 
ratios. 
Table 2. Carbon trading with optimal trading ratios: symmetric scenariosa,b. 
 
ρi = 50 % ki = 0.2  
ki = 0.5 ki = 0.33 ki = 0.2 ki = 0.1 ρi = 25 % ρi = 10 % 
Optimal trading ratios 
      
China 0.877 0.946 0.981 0.995 0.990 0.996 
Europe 1.082 1.037 1.013 1.003 1.007 1.003 
S/SE Asia 1.133 1.055 1.019 1.005 1.010 1.004 
U.S.A. 1.063 1.030 1.011 1.003 1.006 1.002  
St. dev. price 
Marginal damage TR 38.534 25.694 15.418 7.709 10.902 6.895 
Optimal TR 37.649 25.463 15.371 7.704 10.886 6.891  
Expected price 
Marginal damage TR 74.022 74.022 74.022 74.022 74.022 74.022 
Optimal TR 73.838 73.997 74.023 74.023 74.024 74.023  
Total cost 
First best 305.699 305.699 305.699 305.699 305.699 305.699 
Marginal damage TR 321.374 312.554 308.148 306.309 306.921 306.188 
Optimal TR 320.665 312.424 308.132 306.308 306.917 306.187  
Deadweight loss 
Marginal damage TR 15.674 6.855 2.449 0.610 1.222 0.488 
Optimal TR 14.966 6.725 2.432 0.609 1.218 0.488 
Percent reduction 4.5% 1.9% 0.7% 0.16% 0.33% 0.13% 
aThe permit endowment is set so that the marginal damage trading ratios are 1. This represents 
approximately a 50% reduction from BAU emissions. bCosts and deadweight loss (DWL) in 
billions of dollars. Prices in 2007 dollars per ton carbon. 
Table 3. Carbon trading with optimal trading ratios: asymmetric scenariosa,b,c. 
 
kChina = 0.5 kChina = 0.33 kChina = 0.2 kChina = 0.1 
Optimal trading ratios 
    
China 0.798 0.903 0.965 0.991 
Europe 1.146 1.071 1.026 1.007 
S/SE Asia 1.154 1.073 1.027 1.007 
U.S.A. 1.152 1.072 1.027 1.007  
St. dev. price 
Marginal damage TR 30.426 20.285 12.171 6.085 
Optimal TR 27.113 19.312 11.966 6.060  
Expected price 
Marginal damage TR 74.023 74.022 74.022 74.022 
Optimal TR 73.635 73.968 74.031 74.028  
Total cost 
First best 305.699 305.699 305.699 305.699 
Marginal damage TR 315.270 309.934 307.220 306.079 
Optimal TR 313.194 309.516 307.166 306.076  
Deadweight loss 
Marginal damage TR 9.571 4.235 1.521 0.380 
Optimal TR 7.495 3.817 1.467 0.377 
Percent reduction 21.7% 9.9% 3.6% 0.9% 
aFor each column, the tail probabilities are ρChina = 50 % for China and ρROW = 0 % for the 
other three regions. bThe permit endowment is set so that the marginal damage trading ratios are 
1. This represents approximately a 50% reduction from BAU emissions. c Costs and deadweight 
loss (DWL) in billions of dollars. Prices in 2007 dollars per ton carbon. 
In Table 2, we consider symmetric abatement cost shocks (the tail probabilities ρi and the 
percentage change in BAU emissions ki are the same across regions). Because China has the 
largest BAU emissions, shocks to Chinese abatement costs drive the carbon price. Hence 
Chinese emissions covary positively with price under marginal damages trading ratios, and 
Corollary 1 implies that efficiency can be improved by lowering China's trading ratio. Indeed, 
China's optimal trading ratios are below one in each scenario, whereas the trading ratios for the 
other regions exceed one in each scenario. For the largest uncertainty (ki = 0.5 and ρi = 50 %), 
optimal trading ratios reduce the deadweight loss by $0.5 billion or about 5%. For lower levels of 
uncertainty, the gains from optimal trading ratios are more modest. 
Up to now, we have focused exclusively on ex ante expected total costs. This is consistent 
with Weitzman (1974), but we can also analyze differences in ex post outcomes. For a given 
realization of the Θ vector, ex post total costs may be higher or lower with optimal trading ratios 
relative to marginal damage trading ratios. Consider the parameters corresponding to the first 
column of Table 2. For approximately 75% of the realizations, the ex post total costs with 
optimal trading ratios are lower than the ex post total costs with marginal damage trading ratios. 
Given that ex post total costs are lower, the average decrease is $1.40 billion. Given that ex post 
total costs are higher, the average increase is $1.38 billion. The results for the other columns 
of Table 2 are similar. 
In Table 3, we consider asymmetric cost shocks. Here China's abatement costs are uncertain and 
the other regions' abatement costs are known. The gains from using optimal trading ratios are 
more dramatic than in the symmetric case of Table 2. With a high level of uncertainty about 
China's abatement costs (kChina = 0.5), optimal trading ratios reduce the deadweight loss by about 
22% or around $2 billion per year. Turning to ex post costs, the asymmetric cost shock example 
only has two possible realizations of the Θ vector, as costs are either high or low in China. Ex 
post costs are lower under optimal trading ratios for both of these realizations, for all values 
of ki. 
7. Conclusion 
We analyze a model of asymmetric information between a regulator and sources of pollution and 
show that optimal policies are generally not based simply on expected marginal damages. In the 
context of pollution permit markets, we find that optimal trading ratios generally depart from 
marginal damage trading ratios. The regulator can improve efficiency by adjusting the marginal 
damage trading ratios in a manner determined in part by the covariance of the permit price and a 
source's emissions. In simple cases, such as uniformly mixed pollution or linear damages, if a 
source's emissions covary positively with the market price of permits, then the regulator should 
give the source a relatively favorable trading ratio. Intuitively, this favorable trading ratio allows 
additional emissions—despite a fixed cap—in precisely the case when the cap is set too tight from 
an ex post perspective. In the context of an emissions tax, our results imply that the regulator can 
improve ex ante efficiency by setting source-specific taxes according to a Ramsey-like rule 
which adjusts the expected marginal damages to account for the covariance of marginal damages 
with the slope of the marginal abatement costs. 
Our theoretical analysis shows that it is possible for a regulator to improve the efficiency of 
pollution permit markets by using optimal trading ratios. However, whether the regulator should 
implement optimal trading ratios depends crucially on whether the benefits of optimal trading 
ratios are sufficient to offset any additional regulatory costs which might arise from their use. To 
estimate the magnitude of possible benefits, we compare optimal trading ratios to marginal 
damage trading ratios in a global carbon trading market. The results show that the benefits vary 
from significant to trivial depending primarily on the characteristics of the regulator's uncertainty 
about abatement costs. 
As for additional regulatory costs, our discussion of information and implementation issues 
reveals that for non-regular damages optimal trading ratios may not be much more burdensome 
than marginal damage trading ratios. With respect to information, both require the regulator to 
estimate marginal damages by analyzing models of emission transport through the relevant 
physical space in conjunction with models mapping emissions into harm to humans and 
ecosystems. And both require estimating the parameters for the random variables in the 
abatement cost functions. With respect to implementation, both require moving away from the 
intuitively appealing and easy to explain cost-effectiveness criterion. And both give the regulator 
discretion to give differential regulatory requirements to the various sources of pollution, thereby 
potentially opening the door for the sources to lobby or litigate for a more favorable treatment. 
Our results suggest that a reevaluation of the standard treatment of the regulator's uncertainty in 
environmental regulation is in order. Guided by Weitzman (1974), the focus has traditionally 
been on the expected values of the random variables that describe this uncertainty. In his model, 
the regulator need only use expected values to set policy; there is no need to use any higher-order 
moments. In contrast, we find that higher-order moments play a central role for determining 
optimal trading ratios, emission taxes, and even marginal damage trading ratios. 
More generally, the type of regulations we consider illustrate how environmental markets may 
evolve into a middle ground between traditional command and control regulation and what one 
might call mechanism design regulation. Command and control regulation essentially ignores the 
fact that sources have private information about abatement costs. Mechanism design regulation 
induces sources to reveal their private information, and uses the revealed information to tailor the 
regulation for each source. In contrast to these two extremes, to implement optimal trading ratios 
the regulator uses the distribution of each source's private information to tailor the market design 
and improve efficiency. 
Appendix A.  
Proof of Proposition 1 
From Eqs. (2) and (3), the equilibrium for the optimal trading ratios is defined by the n − 1 
equations  for each i ≠ j and by the equation ∑iriei = 1. Differentiating the n − 1 
equations with respect torj gives 
 equation(19) 
where the first equation follows from differentiating and the second equation follows from the 
definition of Eq. (2). Differentiating ∑iriei = 1 with respect to rj implies that 
 equation(20) 
which implies that 
 
where the first equality follows from rearranging Eq. (20), the second equality follows from 
substituting in Eq. (19), and the third equality follows from algebra. Solving this equation 
implies that 
 equation(21) 
which implies from Eq. (19) that 
 equation(22) 
Substituting Eq. (2) into the derivative of the regulator's objective with respect to rj as shown in 
Eq. (4) gives 
 
equation(23) 
where the second equality follows from substituting Eqs. (20), (21) and (22), and the rest follow 
from algebra and the definition of ai and A. 
Now Eq. (6) implies that, at the marginal damage trading ratios, we have . 
Using this in conjunction with the well known result that COV(XY)=E[XY]−E[X]E[Y] implies 
that Eq. (23) can be written as 
 
Applying the covariance formula to the expected value term on the right gives us the equation in 
the proposition. ■ 
Before proving Corollary 1, we first prove a Lemma about the marginal damage trading ratios 
that holds provided damages are regular. 
Lemma 1. 
Suppose that damages are regular. For the marginal damage trading ratios, the regulator 
selects such that 
 
where ai≡ ri2/Ci″and A≡∑iai 
Proof of Lemma 1 
From Eqs. (2) and (3), the equilibrium for marginal damage trading ratios is defined by the n − 1 
equations  for each i ≠ 1 and by the equation ∑iriẽi = 1. Differentiating the n − 1 
equations with respect to r1 gives 
 
 (To derive this equation, we have used the fact that Eqs. (6) and (1) imply that ∂ri/∂r1 = ri/r1). 
Using Eq.(2) we have 
 equation(24) 
for each i ≠ 1. Differentiating ∑iri˜ei = 1 implies that 
equation(25) 
 which implies that 
 equation(26) 
where the first equality comes from  and rearranging Eq. (25), the second equality 
follows from substituting in Eq. (24), and the third equality follows from algebra. Solving this 
equation shows that 
 
which implies 
 equation(27) 
from Eq. (24). 
Substituting Eq. (2) into Eq. (7), the first-order condition for r1, gives 
equation(28) 
 
where the second equality follows from substituting in Eqs. (25) and (27). Multiplying through 
by r1, and noting that  gives the desired result. ■ 
Proof of Corollary 1 
From Lemma 1, it follows that the formula in Proposition 1 can be written as 
 
Because the damage function is regular, we have 
 
It follows from Eq. (3) that  is a constant. Next consider the marginal 
damage function 
 
This is non-stochastic, and so Eq. (6) implies that  for every i. Substituting these 
expressions into the partial derivative above gives 
 
where the third equality follows since  and  are non-stochastic. ■ 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Start with derivative of regulator's objective function. Expanding Eq. (23) gives 
 
Simplifying and then collecting terms gives 
 equation(29) 
Now take the weighted sum of the first-order conditions: 
 
Using Eq. (3) and the definition of ai it follows that 
 
It follows that 
 equation(30) 
Returning to Eq. (29), we solve this equation for rj. This gives 
 
Applying the formula COV(XY)=E[XY]−E[X]E[Y] and Eq. (30) to the second term in the 
numerator gives the desired result. 
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